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An analytical model is developed to explain the increasing tendency of pork packers to 
produce their own hogs.  Upstream integration is motivated by recent events including 
increasing hog buyer consolidation and a need for traceability, but is held in check since it 





  2A Theory of Packer Self Production in the Swine Industry 
The increasing tendency for packers to self produce their own hogs, instead of procure 
them from independent producers, has become a highly contentious issue in the U.S. pork 
sector (Ray; Iowa State Daily).  This form of upstream integration is a step beyond 
arrangements in which a packer or integrator merely owns hogs and contracts their 
husbandry out to small independent producers.  Over the past decade, two large entrants to 
the pork-packing business have elected to raise their own hogs instead of contract with 
independent producers (AMI).  The industry’s most prominent packer, Smithfield Foods 
Inc., identifies itself as “the largest hog producer and pork processor in the world,” and 
currently owns 825,000 sows, more than 12 times the number it owned in 1994 (Freese).  
As of 1999 the 11 largest packers procured an average 18% of hogs from own production, 
a share that has since risen (Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga, Table 1).  
These changes – in conjunction with the fact that U.S. slaughter capacity is falling 
– have led some industry observers to question whether there is a future for small 
independent hog producers (Haggerty, Ray).  Federal and state lawmakers are now 
considering a variety of policies to protect producers.  A bill put before the 108
th Congress 
would “make it unlawful for a packer to own, feed, or control livestock intended for 
slaughter” (1st session, S.27 and HR 719).  Another proposal would require packers to 
procure at least 25% of hogs from spot markets (Carstensen).  Several states already have 
anti-corporate farming laws that prohibit packer ownership of livestock.  However, these 
laws are highly controversial, and are being severely tested.  For example, in 1999 Iowa’s 
ban prevented Smithfield from buying and raising its own hogs there, but a federal judge 
recently ruled that Iowa’s policy is unconstitutional (Iowa State Daily).  
To evaluate the likely impact of such policies and add precision to the debate over 
packer self production, this paper develops an analytical model of the industry’s 
production and processing stages.  The focus is on vertical integration (as opposed to the 
more general concept of vertical coordination) and centers on packer ownership and 
  1husbandry of hogs, versus ownership and husbandry by independent upstream producers.  
The model is an adaptation of Grossman and Hart, who use the concepts of incomplete 
contracts and “relationship specific investments” (cost-saving and quality-enhancing 
investments that are more valuable in one business relationship than in alternatives) as 
determinants of optimal industry structure.  The framework is adapted to the particular 
features of the swine industry using surveys, case studies, and statistics as a guide (e.g., 
Martinez; Lawrence and Grimes; Hennessy and Lawrence).  While the focus is on pork, 
some of the insights carry over to related sectors such as beef.  
The model’s starting point is the observation that while contracts can help 
coordinate the vertical stages of production, complete contracts that cover all 
contingencies are impossible to negotiate, write, interpret, and enforce.  As a result, if a 
contractual relationship breaks down, ultimate control over the use and returns of an asset 
(e.g., hogs, equipment, buildings) lies with its owner.  In such a setting, integration 
increases the acquiring firm’s incentive to make relationship-specific investments that 
maximize the returns from exchange.  
While internalizing a transaction eliminates some problems associated with 
incomplete contracting, it also harms the incentives of the acquired firm’s manager.  (In 
this paper the previously independent upstream producer becomes an upstream manager 
after integration.)  Under integration, the upstream manager can be released, in which case 
he loses all contact with (and returns from) upstream assets.  Since his investments then 
become worthless, his initial incentive to invest in human capital and effort is lower than 
under vertical separation.  This works against the ability of integration to enhance 
efficiency in the vertical chain of production.  
Using this approach, the paper makes a number of points about when and why we 
can expect to see packer self production of hogs.  One finding is that even in an 
environment marked by incomplete contracts, opportunism, and an increasing need for 
packer-producer coordination, integration is not inevitable:  it is often better for the 
  2producer to be left as an independent entity.  This is true even if the packer has such 
bargaining power that she can expropriate all ex post gains from trade with a producer.   
While this bodes well for the future of small independent hog producers, other 
findings show that increased packer self-production may be the result of broad, unalterable 
trends affecting the pork sector as a whole.  To the extent that evolving consumer 
preferences, new production technologies, and heightened concerns about food safety 
place increasing burden on packers, asymmetry in the relative importance of packer versus 
producer investments develops.  As packer investments become more critical, the potential 
for opportunism on the part of the producer also increases unless the packer acquires the 
assets of the upstream producer.   
Another explanation for the rise in upstream integration lies not in 
underinvestment on the part of packers, but on producer underinvestment arising from 
declining outside options for producers.  Consider a scenario where the number of packers 
falls to just one within a well-defined hog-marketing region.  Since the producer now has 
very limited outside options, and since there is always a chance that the relationship might 
fail, producer investment is lower than what maximizes the value of the relationship.  The 
only way to increase investment levels, and thus the level of aggregate profits, is through 
upstream integration by the packer.  
Another point is that heterogeneity in upstream producer management skill and 
size of operations is likely to lead to a partially integrated industry, all else the same.  To 
the extent that relationship-specific investments of small or low-skill producers are 
unproductive relative to those of a packer, the former is likely to be bought out, while 
stronger producers retain their independence.  
These cases are illustrated through numerical simulations of the conceptual model 
developed later in the paper.  The following section very briefly examines alternative 
theories of vertical integration, and argues in favor of a property rights approach to 
examining structural change in the swine industry.  Subsequent sections develop the 
  3specialized version of the Grossman-Hart framework, and use it to investigate recent and 
anticipated events in the evolving pork sector.  The final section concludes. 
 
Alternative explanations for integration (greatly shortened from full version of paper) 
The U.S. hog slaughter market has traditionally been extremely fragmented, with 
large numbers of producers selling to multiple downstream packers.  In such an 
environment, spot markets are generally a very efficient means of transfer.  To explain a 
move towards the other extreme, we must look to the literatures on vertical integration and 
the theory of the firm.  
Coase was one of the first economists to study why some transactions between the 
vertical stages of production are coordinated within a firm, instead of through spot 
markets, contracts, or other means of transfer.  His contributions form the basis of the 
extensive literature on transaction cost economics.  Its central theme is that certain 
transactions between vertical stages are impossible to coordinate through spot markets and 
costly to coordinate through contracts, and are most efficiently coordinated within a firm.  
Transaction costs may be high since contracts can never adequately cover all possible 
states of the world, and thus are imperfect or “incomplete.”  A contract between a 
downstream packer and upstream producer would ideally specify all factors affecting the 
type, quantity, quality, and price of hogs that are raised, including such issues as feed 
ratios, genetics, confinement conditions, and veterinary treatment.  Yet the optimal 
specification of these factors may depend on many unforeseeable aspects, such as 
consumer demand for pork, changing feed and utilities costs, disease outbreaks, 
innovations in genetics, actions of competitors, new food safety regulations, and stricter 
environmental policies.  Contracts are not comprehensive since it is difficult for people to 
think far into the future, it is difficult to negotiate about these plans, and finally, it is hard 
to write these plans so that a third party can interpret and enforce them in the event of a 
dispute (Hart).   
  4Over time transaction cost theories have been enriched by concepts such as asset 
specificities, relationship-specific investments, and holdup, and these are important 
elements of the model in this paper.  However, transaction cost models leave unanswered 
some important questions concerning the vertical boundaries of the firm.  Why are the 
costs of an integrated firm less than those of vertically separated firms?  What is the 
mechanism by which haggling and holdup are eliminated?  Indeed, if it is so efficient to 
organize the vertical stages of production within a single firm, why does not the industry – 
indeed the entire economy – organize itself as a single huge firm with multiple upstream 
and downstream divisions?  Questions such as this lead us to the property rights approach 
developed in the next section.  
 
Property rights theory of the firm 
Like transaction cost theories, Grossman and Hart’s property rights framework begins 
with the idea that there are many aspects of performance over which a contract cannot 
satisfactorily negotiated, written, and enforced.  These aspects may be observable by both 
parties, but not verifiable, such that a dispute could not be easily settled in court.  For 
example, does the producer engage in timely and accurate record keeping?  Is the 
ventilation system programmed to turn on at the right times, and if it fails, does the 
producer quickly get it repaired?  Are the facilities properly cleaned and disinfected 
between animal changeovers?  Does the packer follow through on producer efforts by 
garnering a reputation and tapping premium quality markets?  
As a producer and packer coordinate their activities, investments become 
relationship-specific since an outside party may not be able to observe them or know how 
to capitalize on them.  Yet relationship-specific investments (RSIs) give rise to quasi-rents 
(the difference between the investment’s present use and its salvage value), and the risk 
that the other may try to expropriate this quasi-rent (i.e., “holdup” the other).  To mitigate 
his exposure, a manager might substitute more general methods or make less effort.  In 
other words, there is an incentive to underinvest in the relationship.  Transaction cost 
  5theories show that internalizing the transaction improves incentives for investments in 
human capital and effort.  
Grossman and Hart point out that internalizing a transaction can create other types 
of costs.  Vertical integration may not change governance, but it does change ownership, 
and the residual rights of control.  This latter point matters because when contracts are 
incomplete, the holder of residual rights of control determines use of the asset.   
Consider a packer and producer who are vertically separated, i.e., independently 
owned and managed.  Their initial contract specifies how many hogs the producer supplies 
per day.  If the derived demand for hogs suddenly increases (e.g., consumers lose 
confidence in a pork alternative such as beef, due to a disease outbreak in cattle), the 
packer must seek permission of the producer to increase output.  Under imperfect 
contracting, the producer may threaten to make his operation and expertise unavailable for 
the uncontracted-for supply increase.  To avoid such problems, the packer may integrate 
upstream.  Then the producer is just a manager of the packer’s upstream division, and at 
best can threaten to make his own labor unavailable.  A problem for the packer, however, 
arises from the fact that there is always some chance the relationship breaks down.  In this 
case, the packer keeps all upstream assets and the producer loses all investments.   
Assigning some probability to this possibility, the producer tends to underinvest in the 
relationship.  Should producer investment be critical enough, the benefits of integration 
might be dominated.  
Thus, there are harmful effects associated with the wrong allocation of residual 
rights.  The choice of industry structure reflects a series of tradeoffs in which investment 
incentives are distributed according to their ability to maximize the value of exchange.  
The following section formalizes these ideas.   
 
The model 
The set-up draws from Hart’s treatment, with alterations that reflect the pork sector and 
facilitate exposition.  These include: more general treatment of ex post division of surplus, 
  6specific functional forms,
1 consideration of investments that are not relationship-specific, 
and various restrictions on integration and investment productivity that are reflective of 
the industry.  For example, while upstream integration is deemed possible, downstream 
integration by a producer is ruled out: individual hog producers are assumed too small to 
finance the purchase of a downstream packer’s physical assets (the interest rate can be 
thought of as infinity in this case).  The model as formulated here is also only relevant to 
investments in human, not physical capital, and considers only the incentives of the top 
managers of each firm.
2  
The analysis focuses on two of the industry’s vertical stages: packers (processors), 
who buy live hogs from upstream producers (growers).
3  We adopt the convention of 
calling upstream hog suppliers “producers” and refer to them with a “U,” which means 
“upstream.”  Downstream hog buyers are referred to as “packers,” and sometimes 
identified with a “D,” which means “downstream.”  Producers are referred to with male 
pronouns, and packers are referred to with female pronouns.  Downstream and upstream 
assets are denoted a  and a , respectively.  These are physical, non-human assets, 
including land, buildings, equipment, and other factors of production.  Under vertical 
separation the packer owns  , and the producer owns a .  Under upstream integration, 






There are two stages: 1 and 2.  In stage 1, the productive assets of producers and 
packers (  and  ) are already in place.  We consider a packer who is the only buyer of 
hogs in a region, and thus a virtual monopsony (similar to Azzam).  There are many price-
taking upstream producers who are willing to supply the packer with hogs.  We focus on a 
representative producer who, in contracting with the packer, receives his reservation 
payoff at stage 1.  The packer expropriates the rest of the surplus generated through stage 
1 contracting.  
D a U a
The producer and packer have the opportunity to enhance the productivity of their 
trade through relationship-specific investments, which are also made in stage 1.  The 
investment is anything that changes the productivity of the assets, and can be thought of as 
  7investments in human capital and effort.  For example, consider the possibility of an 
equipment failure that threatens the production of hogs with certain characteristics.  The 
problem can be resolved if the producer makes a good deal of effort to resolve the 
problem, perhaps by anticipating and getting training for the problem beforehand, and by 
staying after normal working hours on the day the problem occurs.  However, the 
producer’s incentive to respond depends on whether the producer is an independent 
owner/operator, versus just an employee of the packer’s upstream division.  In the latter 
case, the producer lacks residual rights of control, and has less incentive to resolve the 
problem to the best of his ability.  
As discussed earlier, there is ambiguity regarding the details and circumstances of 
the input to be created.  This precludes the writing of a complete contract that covers all 
contingencies, and the price paid by the packer to the upstream producer is not determined 
until stage 2.  Upon resolving this, there is bargaining over the ex post division of surplus 
from trade.  Now the packer’s stage 1 bargaining advantage has been eroded, since there 
are just two parties to divide up the surplus arising from trade under relationship-specific 
investments.  In the words of Williamson (1985), a “fundamental transformation” occurs 
in going from the stage 1 single packer / many producer environment, to the stage 2 one 
packer / one producer environment.  The outcome of negotiations is an efficient operating 
decision: the firms will come to an arrangement that maximizes the gains from trade.  The 
model is set up so that whenever investments are relationship-specific, there are ex post 
gains from trade, and the two parties find it optimal to do so.  At the same time, the 
possibility that trade can break down due to imperfection of contracts is a key factor for 
agents as they select levels of relationship-specific investments.  
Let   be the downstream packer’s ex post payoff, and i  be the value of the 
packer’s relationship-specific investment (RSI).  Productivity of that investment under 
trade (T) with the producer is  .  Let r be packer revenue in the absence of 
investment and trade (i.e., spot markets are used), and let overall packer revenue under 
trade be uppercase  , with the following form:   =  .  Let p be the 
D Π D
( T i
0 > T D
T R ) ( D T i R
2 / 1 ) 2 D D r +
  8stage 2 equilibrium cost of procuring the input.  The packer’s ex post payoff less 
investment under trade is then:  
D D i − Π   =   =   .    D D T i p i R − − ) ( D D T i p i D r − − +
2 / 1 ) ( 2
 Let  Π  be the upstream producer’s ex post payoff, and i  be the value of the 
producer’s RSI.  In turn, U  determines the productivity of that investment under 
trade.  c is producer costs in the absence of any trade or investment, and   is overall 
upstream producer costs under trade with the packer:    .  Then, the 
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To have a benchmark against which to compared the second best environment 
described in earlier sections, we calculate the unobtainable first best choice of 
investments.  This involves jointly selecting i  and   to maximize the stage 1 net present 
value of their trading relationship, which is:  
U D i
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Denote   as the unique first-best solution to the problem.  (FB stands for First 
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Total surplus from the relationship under this efficient outcome is:  









D T i i C i i − − − ) ( ) (
2 2 ) ( ) ( T T U D c r + + −
 In  the  second best environment described earlier, contracts between packer and 
producer are incomplete, and stage 1 investments are chosen non-cooperatively.  The 
stage 2 equilibrium price ( p ) is some deviation from a non-specific “generic” input price 
( p ) as given by the spot market.  The ex post gains from trade are the difference between 
revenues and costs under trade ( T T C R − ), less the difference between revenues and costs 
when the relationship breaks down and there is no trade ( NT NT C R − ):  
) ( ) ( NT NT T T C R C R − − − .    
  9This equals the available quasi-rents (the value of assets under RSIs and trade, less the 
asset’s next best alternative use).  Let θ  represent the downstream packer share of ex post 
gains from trade that result from the bargaining process.  Upstream share is then  θ − 1 .  
(Under a Nash equilibrium θ  = ½.)  The ex post payoffs can be calculated as:  
             D Π = p RT − = ] p RNT [ −  +  )] ( ) [( NT NT T T C R C R − − − θ    
             U Π = T C p− = ] NT C p− [  +  )] ( ) )[( 1 ( NT NT T T C R C R − − − −θ . 
Either of these can be solved for equilibrium stage 2 price of the input (p):  
p     = ) ( ) )( 1 ( NT T NT T C C R R p − + − − + θ θ  
To derive the second-best choice of investments, p is plugged into the downstream and 
upstream ex post payoffs less investment costs:  
            D D i − Π = D U NT D NT U T D T i i C i R i C i R p − + − + − + − ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( θ θ θ θ    (1) 
            U U i − Π = U U NT D NT U T D T i i C i R i C i R p − − − − − − − + ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( θ θ θ θ . (2) 
In the second-best scenario, the downstream manager independently chooses   to 
maximize (1), and the upstream manager chooses i  to maximize (2).  The associated 
second-best first order conditions are:  
D i
U
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where SB stands for second best.  Total surplus from trade under second-best choice of 









D T i i i C i R − − − ) ( ) ( .  A second best scenario will be 
calculated for vertical separation (VS) and another for upstream integration (UI).  
(Hereafter, SB will be dropped and replaced with the specific case under consideration, VS 
or UI, to simplify notation.)  The outcome with highest total surplus is optimal to both the 
producer and packer.  
 
Vertical Separation 
Under vertical separation the producer owns and operates the upstream asset, while the 
packer owns and operates the downstream asset.  To calculate aggregate surplus ( ), we 
must identify revenues and costs under a no-trade situation, since the agents put weight on 




  10downstream investment productivity under vertical separation and no trade.  When 
investments are relationship-specific, this is less than productivity under trade between the 
two partners (i.e.,  ).  Then, under vertical separation and no trade, downstream 
revenue is   
T
VS
NT D D <
( 2 D
VS
NT i D r =
VS
NT R
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D i R − )
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Let U  denote upstream investment productivity under vertical separation and no 
trade.  When investments are relationship-specific, this is less than U .  As before, c 
denotes upstream costs without any investments or trade.  Then, upstream producer costs 
under no trade are: C   .  Based on (3) and our chosen functional forms, 
the optimal (second best) choice of investments under vertical separation are:  
T




D i   




U U U i θ θ + − =  
In terms of the productivity parameters and packer bargaining share, total surplus from the 
relationship under vertical separation is:  
       =     
VS S
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Upstream integration 
Under upstream integration, the packer integrates backwards and purchases the assets of 
the producer.  The producer can either become a manager (i.e., there is “trade”), or is 
released, in which case his income is normalized to zero (there is “no trade”).   
Downstream revenue without trade is:  =
UI
NT R  
2 / 1 ) ( 2 D
UI
NT i D r + , where productivity under 
no-trade and upstream integration ( ) is higher than under the vertical separation case, 






NT D D < < ).  Upstream productivity in the absence 
of trade is zero (U = 0), which implies that upstream producer costs without any trade 
are simply: Cc .    
Based on (3) and our chosen functional forms, the optimal (second best) choice of 
investments under vertical separation are:  
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  11In terms of the productivity parameters and packer bargaining share, total surplus from the 
relationship under upstream integration is:  
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Using (4) and (5), it can be shown that vertical separation dominates integration 
( ) whenever:  
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This clarifies how the productivity parameters drive the outcome regarding optimal 
industry structure.  We will occasionally refer back to (6) as we work through the cases 
below.  Table 1 presents a summary of the above key results.   
 
Numerical illustrations 
Special cases of the model are used to represent how the pork sector has evolved over 
time.  The cases are numerical to facilitate exposition, and build on the following baseline 
assumptions.  In Cases 1 – 5, the gains from trade are split as in the Nash bargaining 
scenario, implying that packer share is θ  = 0.50.  Packer value of output in the absence of 
investment and trade is arbitrarily chosen to be r = 300.  Producer costs in the absence of 
investment and trade are chosen to be somewhat lower: c = 200 (these assumptions are 
largely inconsequential for subsequent results).    
The remaining values concern investment productivity under different ownership 
structures ( ,  ,  , U , and U ).  These vary according to the case that is being 
considered, and are what drive the results.  An important caveat is as follows.  The use of 
numerical examples facilitates the exposition, but is not to be confused with statistical 
analysis.  Although the outcomes are cardinal in nature, ultimately the results are treated 
as ordinal (i.e., results are evaluated only in terms of rank).  In some cases the optimal 
industry structure may appear to have only a slight advantage over the alternative, but it is 









  12Case 1:  Investments are not relationship specific 
This baseline scenario represents the historical organization of the swine industry.   
Investments in human capital or effort can be made by producer or packer, and these 
influence the cost and quality of pork.  However, there are very large numbers selling to 
large numbers of packers, and identities are not maintained.  Thus these investments are 
not relationship-specific; any investment has equal value outside a given packer-producer 
combination.  We can represent this in the model by equalizing packer and producer 
investment productivities:  







These values are arbitrarily assigned to be 4.  
Based on the formulas of Table 1, the numerical results for Case 1 are presented in 
Table 2.  Looking at the left data column, it is seen that packer investments under the two 
alternative industry structures (i  and  ) are first-best optimum (16).  In turn, producer 
investment under vertical separation (i ) matches the first-best optimum (16).  Producer 
investment under upstream integration (i ), however, is just 4.  If the packer owns both 
downstream and upstream assets, the producer is now just a manager of the upstream 
division, and loses all investments in human capital and effort if he is released by the 
packer.  Putting some weight on this possibility, his investments are sub-optimal.  Loss of 
residual rights of control makes the producer’s private return from investment less than the 









As a result, the highest second-best joint surplus is obtained under vertical 
separation (132) as opposed to upstream integration (128).
4  When investments in effort 
and expertise work equally well with any trading partner, it is optimal (for all industry 
participants) to leave the producer as an independent owner/operator.   
Thus, Case 1 offers an explanation as to why pork production has traditionally 
been carried out by spot markets.  Spot markets and arm’s length contracting perform 
better than integration in this setting.   
 
  13Case 2:  Investments are relationship specific 
Recent studies document the increasing importance of asset specificities and relationship-
specific investments in pork production and processing (e.g., Martinez; Hennessy and 
Lawrence).  In this environment, producer-packer coordination can have major influences 
on meat quality and food safety, and may involve non-contractible investments in asset-
specific skills that are not easily transferred to others.  The packer may market products on 
the basis that certain practices are carried out in a timely and careful manner. Examples of 
such coordination may involve improvements in: (a) confinement conditions, including 
pig density, separation by age and gender, air temperature, circulation, dust, provision of 
rooting material; (b) timely inspection of hogs to ensure that sick and injured pigs receive 
immediate attention and teeth grinding is minimized; (c) treatment during transit of hogs 
to a slaughter facility (e.g., no use of electric goads); (d) accurate record-keeping; and (e) 
time spent at the slaughter facility, with no mixing of hogs from different groups.  
As the importance of such coordination increases, investments have less value 
outside of a given producer-packer relationship.  To capture this Case 2 assumes that:  







Investments are “relationship-specific” since   >   >  , and since U  > U .  
 means that packer investments are more productive when she retains the 
producer’s expertise.   >  signifies that packer investment productivity is higher 
when she has access to upstream as well as downstream assets (even though the producer 
is not retained).  U >U  indicates that producer investment productivity under trade 

















Another key assumption is that producer investments are not more critical than 
packer investments, and vice-versa.  Similarity in upstream and downstream investment 





Case 2 results are in the second data column of Table 2.  Looking near the bottom, 
second-best aggregate profits are higher under vertical separation (  = 164) than under 
packer upstream integration (  = 162).  The problem with integration relative to 
VS S
UI S
  14separation is understood through examination of packer and producer investments.  Under 
separation they both invest 16, but under upstream integration, the producer has less 
incentive to invest (9).  As an independent owner/operator, the producer keeps the hogs 
even if the relationship breaks down, and is therefore more willing to come up with cost-
saving and quality-enhancing innovations.  Integration eliminates the producer’s residual 
rights of control, and lowers his incentive to invest.  When the investments of both units 
are of comparable importance, vertical separation is ideal. 
 
Case 3:  Producers with unproductive investment 
In the two cases so far, vertical separation has been ideal, regardless whether investments 
in human capital and effort are relationship-specific.  Cases 3 – 5, on the other hand, 
introduce more detail from the swine industry and result in upstream integration being 
optimal.  Case 3 begins with the observation that there is considerable heterogeneity in 
management style and size of operations among upstream producers.  Such differences 
affect the degree to which upstream investments enhance the value of producer-packer 
exchange.  In the context of our model, the RSIs of smaller and less sophisticated 
operations are likely to be less productive from the viewpoint of a packer.  For example, 
certain producers are less willing and able than others to adopt and maximize the gain 
from new technologies.  Likewise, producer investment in a 200-sow operation ultimately 
has a lower payoff from the perspective of a packer than a 5000-sow operation. 
C a s e  3  a l t e r s  C a s e  2  t o  r e f l e c t  t h i s  possibility.  The productivity of upstream 
investment under trade (U ) is halved from 6 to 3 (Table 2).  Since U  > U  still holds, 
upstream investments are relationship-specific, as in Case 2.  However, upstream 




Going back to inequality (6), which shows the conditions under which vertical 
separation dominates integration, a decrease in U  decreases the likelihood that vertical 
separation is optimal.  The (negative) derivative of the right-hand side of (6) is:  
T
0    since       0 2
] ) 2 [(
















  15Since (6)’s right-hand-side value falls, upstream integration is now more likely.  
Table 2 provides the numerical version of this result.  Under either industry 
structure, Case 3 optimal upstream investments are lower than the corresponding values in 
Case 2.  Upstream investment under vertical separation (i ) falls from 16 to 6, and 
upstream investment under integration (i ) falls from 9 to 2 (Table 2).  Of these changes, 
the fall is largest under vertical separation.  Looking at the total surplus from trade, 
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Thus it can be worthwhile for a packer to buy out the assets of upstream producers 
who are otherwise unable to derive much traction from their efforts.  To the extent that an 
upstream producer appears like the one in Case 3 (versus Case 2), it is less likely to 
survive as an independent firm.  Given the degree of heterogeneity among U.S. hog 
producers, we might expect to see a partially integrated pork sector.  For example, if half 
the industry’s producers resemble the one in Case 2, and the other half reflects the smaller 
/ less sophisticated producer in Case 3, then half of U.S. hogs will be raised by 
independent producers, and half will be self-produced by packers.  
 
Case 4:  Increasing burden on packer 
The basic observation of Case 4 is that there are an increasing number of burdens borne by 
packers, and these burdens increase the importance of packer investment relative to 
producer investment.  This point is made, for example, in Hennessy and Lawrence (p. 60-
62).  Producers are still recognized to play a key role in delivering low-cost high-quality 
products, and influencing food safety, environmental, and animal welfare outcomes.   
However, the packer may bear the brunt of the reputation and liability concerns.  Packers 
are few in number, and closer to the retail market than producers (indeed, their branded 
products may be a household name).  Packers transmit signals about preferences and costs 
between consumers and producers, and bear the brunt of quality and food safety concerns.  
Packing plants may be monitored by regulatory authorities, and packers must be 
responsive to the demands of export customers and their own brand managers.
5  
  16In this environment, packer investment in the relationship becomes the dominant 
determinant of producer-packer joint value.  This is modeled in Case 4 by increasing the 
productivity of packer investments relative to Case 2 (the last case for which vertical 
separation was ideal).  In particular,   is raised from 6 to 10.  T D
Going back to inequality (6), which shows the conditions under which vertical 
separation dominates integration ( ), an increase in   increases the left-hand 
side of (6): 
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As packer RSI productivity grows, upstream integration is more likely. 
This is borne out in the numerical analysis of Table 2.  Here, second-best 
aggregate profits are higher under integration (  = 218) than under vertical separation 
(  = 216).  As before, this result is driven by investments.  Under vertical separation, 
packer and producer optimal investments are 36 and 16, respectively.  Yet with 
integration, the packer is willing to invest 49, and the high   makes the most of this 
investment.  The packer will not invest this much under vertical separation due to the 
possibility of non-cooperation on the part of the producer.  If the packer is to attain 





Case 5:  Fewer downstream hog buyers 
This case provides a distinct rationale for integration based on the trend towards packer 
horizontal consolidation and closure of existing packing plants.  Suppose that a producer 
has traditionally been able to sell hogs to more than one packer in his locality.   
Investments are relationship-specific, so if trade does not occur within a relationship, the 
investment is less productive when the producer sells to alternative packers.  Yet since 
these alternatives know the producer and his management style/expertise, the productivity 
loss is minimal.  Specifically, U  is less than U , but not to a great extent.  So far this 
setting is consistent with Case 2.  
VS
NT T
  17Now suppose the number of packers falls to one.  This may be due to horizontal 
consolidation (to exercise market power or spread the fixed costs of new safety 
provisions) or due to closure of outdated facilities.  The producer can still sell to an 
unknown packer located far outside his area, but there is a cost.  The productivity of 
investment falls off greatly in this case: U  declines to zero.  This may occur because the 
distance traveled is far, and the extra time in transit and storage harms animal well-being.  
Such stress can have a major impact on meat quality.  The alternative, unknown packer 
may also have no understanding of the producer’s expertise and management style.   
Producer investments are misread and unexploited, and the packer processes the hogs into 
undifferentiated low-quality products.  
VS
NT
In the context of equation (6), the decrease in U  causes the right-hand side of 
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and integration becomes more likely.  In our numerical illustration (bottom section of 
Table 2), Case 5 second-best aggregate profits are higher under integration (  = 162) 
than vertical separation (  = 159).  Examination of optimal investments reveals that the 
producer’s incentive to invest under vertical separation falls to 9 from 16 in Case 2.  All 
other investments are the same as in Case 2.  Upstream investment is now no better under 
vertical separation than under integration.  Since the packer is always willing to invest 
more under integration (since it gains access to both sets of assets and all residual rights of 




Case 6: Packer derives all surplus from relationship 
Case 6 revisits Cases 1 – 5 with an altered assumption about the ex post division of 
surplus.  Until now, the “fundamental transformation” associated with relationship-
specific investments has ensured that ex post gains from trade are split 50:50.  Case 6, in 
contrast, assumes that the packer has 100% of ex post bargaining power, and expropriates 
  18all gains from trade.  This reflects the overwhelming power a near-monopsony may hold 
when dealing with small producers. 
In the context of the model, assigning all bargaining power to the producer implies 
that  1 = θ  instead of ½.  With  1 = θ , the packer has no concern about holdup, and her 
investment is equal to the first best investment, irrespective of industry structure:  
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This is true regardless of which productivity assumptions from Cases 1 – 5 are adopted.  
Second-best producer investments, on the other hand, are affected dramatically.  This is 
especially so in the case of upstream integration, in which case it drops to zero: 
1 for         0 ] ) 1 [(
2 = = − = θ θ T
UI
U U i . 
It is not generally zero under vertical separation, however, since the producer can count 
on a reasonably productive outside option if trade with the packer does not take place.  
Only in Case 5, wherein U  is upstream investment actually zero.   0 =
UI
NT
The fact that second-best producer investment is typically highest under vertical 
separation makes it optimal when  1 = θ , in Cases 1 – 4 ( ).  When Case 5 is 
revisited with 
UI VS S S >
1 = θ , however, upstream investment turns out to be zero under both 
industry structures.  In this setting, vertical separation and integration yield an equivalent 
level of overall surplus ( ).   
UI VS S S =
Thus, if the packer can extract all the surplus from a relationship (both ex ante and 
ex post) vertical separation is likely to prevail, at least under the assumptions of our 
model.  Under vertical separation, the upstream producer is willing to invest because there 
is always the possibility that trade may break down, in which case the producer sells his 
hogs to someone else.  When the packer owns the upstream assets and expropriates all ex 
post surplus, however, the producer’s incentive to make a relationship-specific investment 
completely subsides.  This is important enough that the packer is better off letting the 
producer remain an independent owner/operator.  
 
  19Conclusions 
Debate on the reasons for packer self production in the swine industry is intense, but 
theoretical models of the underlying economic forces are only just emerging in the 
literature.  The model of this paper is a tool for understanding the trend towards packer 
upstream integration based on Grossman and Hart’s property rights theory of the firm.   
One point is that the evolving need for producers and packers to coordinate their 
cost-saving and quality-enhancing investments does not imply that upstream integration is 
inevitable.  In becoming the manager of a packer’s upstream division as a result of 
integration, a hog producer’s residual rights of control over upstream assets are 
eliminated, and he has reduced incentive to make investments in human capital and effort.  
A second point is that increasing burdens on packers (owing to forces including 
more sophisticated consumer demands and the need for traceability in the food system) 
create asymmetries in packer versus producer investment productivity, and are a force for 
upstream integration.  In this case, integration increases the packer’s assurance of 
receiving a return on relationship-specific investments.   
A distinct source of integration is horizontal consolidation among packers.  As the 
outside options of producers deteriorate, the productivity of relationship-specific 
investment falls to zero should a relationship break down.  As a result, producers invest in 
effort and human capital no more than they would under upstream integration.  Since the 
latter gives the downstream packer full residual rights of control, upstream integration 
becomes optimal in this case.  
A further finding is that the weaker investment productivity of upstream producers 
with small operations and lower management expertise can also act as a force for 
upstream integration.  All else the same, heterogeneity in producer size and management 
skills may result in a partially integrated industry in which small hog operations are 
bought out by packers, and strong hog operations are left as independent.  
Another point is that as the bargaining power of packers grows, upstream 
integration turns out to be less likely, all else the same.  As packers expropriate more and 
  20more of the surplus generated through a relationship with a producer, the producer’s 
incentive to make cost-saving and quality-enhancing investments declines.  
Some of these results may not be novel to readers familiar with the property rights 
theory of the firm, but they have yet to emerge as clearly understood facets in the literature 
on vertical integration in the livestock industry.  The results can also play a role in 
highlighting the limitations of relying too heavily on traditional price, quantity, and cost 
data when making inferences about the evolving structure of the livestock industry.  The 
underlying forces identified in this paper are difficult if not impossible to quantify, and 
even if they somehow can be, such data are unlikely to be publicly available. 
The model can be extended in a number of ways to address other important issues, 
such as how lower-level worker incentives are affected by changes in ownership.  The 
model could incorporate multiple packers and producers, integrators, and a retail sector to 
better depict the mechanisms by which changes in ownership affect optimal industry 
structure.  In turn, it may be useful to look at more than just ex ante investment 
inefficiencies, such as bargaining inefficiencies related to the existence of private 
information.  
  21Table 1.  Investment and the gains from trade:  Summary of analytical results 
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Note:  “First best” scenarios are for reference purposes only; they are unobtainable under the assumptions of 
the model.  
  22Table 2.  Investment and total surplus:  Numerical results for Cases 1 – 5 
    Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 
Productivity of downstream (packer) investment     
 
T D   4  6  6 10 6 
 
UI
NT D   4 4 4 4 4 
 
VS
NT D   4 2 2 2 2 
        
Productivity of upstream (producer) investment     
 
T U   4 6 3 6 6 
 
VS
NT U   4 2 2 2 0 
         
Optimal downstream (packer) investment       
  Separation (i ) 
VS
D 16 16 16 36 16 
  Integration ( ) 
UI
D i 16 25 25 49 25 
  First Best (i ) 
FB
D 16  36  36 100 36 
         
Optimal upstream (producer) investment       
  Separation (i ) 
VS
U 16  16 6 16 9 
  Integration ( ) 
UI
U i 4 9 2 9 9 
  First Best (i)  
FB
U 16 36  9  36 36 
         
Total surplus from trade         
  Separation ( ) 
VS S 132 164 141 216 159 
  Integration ( ) 
UI S 128 162 142 218 162 
  First Best (  
FB S) 132 172 145 236 172 
Notes:  Bold font corresponds to optimal industry structure.  Productivity values are synthetic and for 
illustrative purposes only.  “First best” scenarios are unobtainable; they are for reference purposes only.  
Surplus from trade is divided as in the Nash bargaining solution (θ  =  ½).  
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1 Functional forms are inspired by Church and Ware’s treatment, and embody diminishing 
returns to investment.  
2 Hart and Moore extend the analysis to other workers within the firm.  This is less 
important for the pork sector since hog producers are often owned and operated by the 
same individual.   
3 A richer depiction of the production and marketing system might allow for and 
distinguish among other possible participants, e.g., integrators, cooperatives, purebred 
producers, feeder pig producers, farrow-to-finish producers, hog finishers, order buyers 
and dealers, and so forth.  Our focus on a small independent “producer” and single large 
“packer” keeps the analysis tractable, and gets to the heart of issues.   
4 Vertical separation yields same results as the (unobtainable) efficient outcome.   
5 In Smithfield’s 2001 annual report, the president of the firm’s largest processing 
subsidiary, Lewis Little, discusses upstream integration in the context of food safety and 
reputational issues.  Self production of hogs makes it “a relatively easy matter for us to tell 
our customers where the hogs were raised for their products, what they were fed at each 
step along the way, and when and where they were processed.” 